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


1 September 1962

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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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STATE, NAVY review(s) completed.



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Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600010001-7

1 September 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

[Redacted]

2. USSR-Berlin: Soviet authorities pressing to equate their access rights to West Berlin with Allied access rights. (Page *ii*)

25X1

- [Redacted]
4. Cuba: Regime steps up propaganda on imminence of US invasion. (Page *iv*)
5. Congo: UN plan for Congo settlement reported accepted by Katanga. (Page *v*)

25X1

- [Redacted]
7. Indonesia: Army concerned that Communists may obtain key posts in future administration of West New Guinea. (Page *vii*)

25X1

8. Nationalist China - Macao: [Redacted] sabotage explosions along Macao and Hong Kong borders with Communist China. (Page *viii*)

25X1

(Continued)

1 September 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS  
(Continued)

9. France: De Gaulle attempting to push through constitutional amendment to provide for direct popular election of his successor. (*Page ix*)
10. West Germany: Adenauer's public expression of doubt over Britain's participation in European political union provokes domestic opposition.  
(*Page x*)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600010001-7

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600010001-7

USSR-Berlin: [Soviet military authorities in East Germany are making vigorous efforts to equate their right of access to West Berlin with Allied access rights.]

[In a move to reinforce a series of demands made since 23 August, General Yakubovsky, chief of the Soviet forces in the GDR, warned the US and British commanders in chief in Europe on 30 August that if the practice of escorting Soviet vehicles carrying guards to the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin is not halted, "it will be necessary to take retaliatory measures against your vehicles which pass on routes under our (Soviet) control."]

[The USSR's immediate objective probably is to remove what it regards as a restriction on its freedom of movement within West Berlin. The Russians are particularly sensitive to the presence of West Berlin police in the US escort parties.]

[Yakubovsky's threats may have the more far-reaching aim of deterring the West from blocking Soviet entry into West Berlin should the East Germans impose measures which would have the effect of denying Allied military access to East Berlin.]

[If the Western powers, however, take action to exclude the USSR from West Berlin in response to East German moves, the "retaliatory measures" threatened by Yakubovsky may include associating the East Germans with Soviet control procedures at autobahn checkpoints. This would be consistent with present Soviet tactics directed at achieving the main objectives of the separate peace treaty by gradual unilateral actions.]

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\*Cuba: The Cuban military alert which began on 29 August was intensified on 30 and 31 August as the Castro regime stepped up its propaganda on the imminence of a "US invasion."

The Guantanamo Naval Base received a report on 30 August that residents of the neighboring city of Caimanera had been advised not to leave their homes on 1 September, as the regime expected an invasion on that date. The base also reported hearing of troop and heavy equipment movements recently in several areas of Cuba's easternmost Oriente Province.

US press representatives in Havana reported on 31 August that the Cuban capital was astir with unexplained military activity. They cited rumors circulating through the city that "something was going on" at the eastern end of the island despite the absence of any official report of trouble.

25X1

1 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

iv

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25X1 [ ] Congo: [ ] the UN-sponsored plan for a settlement in the Congo has been accepted by the Katangan cabinet. [ ]

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[ ] Tshombé intended to accept the plan, but with reservations, intending to re-establish Katangan "independence" after the departure of the UN forces. He reportedly expects the UN to leave by the end of the year.

Katangan authorities, meanwhile, are harassing UN military and civilian personnel in a manner reminiscent of their actions before the outbreak of fighting last December.

The US consul in Elisabethville reports that during the past few days European and African civilian employees have been beaten and arrested, and Katangan forces have fired on some UN positions. The Katangans continue to confiscate UN supplies--food-stuffs, trucks, and aviation gasoline--coming in from the Rhodesias. An increasing number of mercenaries have appeared in Elisabethville within the past two weeks.

25X1

1 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

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Indonesia: [The Indonesian Army is concerned that Communists may obtain key posts in the future Indonesian administration of West New Guinea.]

[The army wants to establish a military administration when the interim period of UN control ends next spring. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) favors a civilian administration, in which Sukarno might give it representation. The PKI presumably believes that once it had been allowed to participate in a West New Guinea administration it could argue that Communists should plan a larger role in other local administrations in Indonesia. Army opposition has hitherto been strong enough to prevent significant Communist influence in such administrations.]


[The PKI reportedly is placing party members in teacher teams which the Indonesian Government plans to send to West New Guinea soon. Sukarno has called for 2,000 teacher volunteers.]

1 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1



1 Sept 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page

25X1

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**Nationalist China - Macao:**

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Portuguese authorities in Macao fear that the recent sabotage operations against the Chinese Communists in the border area will give Peiping a pretext for interfering in Macao affairs. The Communists had previously warned the Portuguese against allowing the colony to be used as a base for Nationalist operations.

The recent incidents of sabotage have occurred in an area of China where there has been evidence of unrest during the past year. Peiping has tightened border security following the explosions.

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(Map)

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1 Sept 62

**DAILY BRIEF**

viii

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France: De Gaulle apparently intends to exploit public anxiety over his possible assassination to push through a constitutional amendment providing for direct election of his successor by universal suffrage.

Some 80,000 "grand electors," including members of parliament and of local councils, now choose France's president for a seven-year term. De Gaulle reportedly feels his successor should have the mandate of direct universal elections. Parliament, however, reluctant to surrender its voice in the matter, appears unwilling to vote either a constitutional amendment or authority to amend by public referendum. The 30 August announcement that such a referendum will be held at the end of October suggests that De Gaulle now expects public concern to force parliament's approval.

De Gaulle is cool to any proposal for a vice president who would serve out an uncompleted term. He probably has reservations about any move that would suggest that he is not indispensable. In the event of his incapacity or death, the president of the senate becomes president ad interim and a new president must be elected in 20 to 50 days.

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the French public, following the 22 August assassination attempt on De Gaulle, expect him to be assassinated rather than to be removed from the scene by natural causes.

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West Germany: [Adenauer's recent public questioning of the appropriateness of Britain's participation in a European political union has provoked a strongly adverse reaction in West Germany and damaged the chancellor's standing in his own party.]

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[Foreign Minister Schroeder, who strongly favors inclusion of Britain in the political as well as the economic side of European integration, has indicated to a US Embassy official]

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[that Adenauer is frustrated over the repeated delays in political integration.]

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1 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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